“It is a great risk to think of your reality in Arabic,” Mahdi Amel, the Lebanese communist, famously declared. In Lebanon and Palestine, thinking in Arabic became a weapon of decolonising war. But in post-1979 Iran, the linguistic colonisation of the country accelerated. Pointing to the subsequent theocratic regime as the consequence of “nativist”, anti-Western thought, the Iranian intelligentsia distanced itself from problematising the situation through the lens of colonialism. Isolated and disconnected from meaningful ties to the West, it instead attempted to think of its reality in English, French, and German. The dynamics of anti-imperialism and state oppression took on distinct expressions in each Middle Eastern “nation-state.” Yet, the Islamic Republic of Iran became an exceptional, infamous symbol of the oppressive and anti-Western characteristics associated with “political Islam,” a concept that has been reinterpreted for drastically different purposes.
The issue thus becomes not only one of translation in a geopolitical context but also one of translation between isolated instances of universalised capitalist governmentality, like Iran, and the overarching universality of capitalist relations. This particularity seems to have fostered various forms of (anti-)imperialist othering when it comes to viewing struggles in Iran: from the perspective of Western imperialism, these struggles are seen as rooted in an absolutely defined past—erasing the lineage of solidarity with Arab, Afghan, and Kurdish revolutionaries—and an assumed future, represented by Western liberal democracy. Meanwhile, Eurocentric and/or Orientalist anti-imperialists dismiss revolutionary subjects in favour of a geopolitical narrative where only great powers are agents of History.
This dialectic of isolation contributed to the rise of campist anti-imperialism regarding Iran and to the imperialist co-optation of Iranian struggles. And between these two forces, the Left seems to have lost its way in translation.
Before the 1979 Revolution, Iranian revolutionaries and their Arab comrades from various countries—particularly united under the banner of the Palestinian cause—maintained organic, organisational connections. Armed militants fought together and received military training in the same camps, most notably in South Lebanon. This period, unmarked by the Islamist/Non-Islamist divide that characterises the present situation, was defined by alliance, cooperation, the coproduction of militant knowledge, and dialogue. However, in the decades following the 1979 Revolution, these connections were largely severed.
The breakdown in communication has manifested in the profound confusion in understanding contemporary Iran, both from within and from without. For decades, theorists from both the left and the right have debated the nature of Iran’s political economy. Some have described it as state capitalism, others as neoliberal capitalism, while some reject the notion that it represents any form of capitalism at all. Among these critics, some characterise Iran’s economy as one of predation, hoarding, or as a confiscatory regime.
A similar ambiguity surrounds the nature of the Iranian state’s governmentality: is it a pre-modern regime? A fundamentalist Islamist one, embodying “political Islam”? Or is it modern—perhaps even exercising a form of neoliberal governmentality?
The debate extends to Iran’s place in global power dynamics. Some argue that it is part of the anti-imperialist camp, resisting the hegemony of the West by forming an “axis of resistance.” Others label it a sub-imperialist state, attempting to dominate the Middle East through its “proxies.” Famously, it has been categorised as part of the “axis of evil,” drawing comparisons to North Korea in its approach to international relations. Another perspective views Iran as being within the orbit of the Russia-China alliance, serving as a tool for these global superpowers.
This special profile on Iran seeks to address these points of contention and to present a clearer image of the country, beginning with a conference featuring eight panels focused on the relationship between Iran and its neighbouring countries in the region. These discussions will take place in dialogue between Iranian scholars, activists, thinkers and their comrades from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, Turkey and Palestine.
This conference will lay the groundwork for an upcoming Weird Economies summer school focused on broader themes related to Iran, including its political economy, geopolitical position, and the history of the left in the country.
“It is a great risk to think of your reality in Arabic,” Mahdi Amel, the Lebanese communist, famously declared. In Lebanon and Palestine, thinking in Arabic became a weapon of decolonising war. But in post-1979 Iran, the linguistic colonisation of the country accelerated. Pointing to the subsequent theocratic regime as the consequence of “nativist”, anti-Western thought, the Iranian intelligentsia distanced itself from problematising the situation through the lens of colonialism. Isolated and disconnected from meaningful ties to the West, it instead attempted to think of its reality in English, French, and German. The dynamics of anti-imperialism and state oppression took on distinct expressions in each Middle Eastern “nation-state.” Yet, the Islamic Republic of Iran became an exceptional, infamous symbol of the oppressive and anti-Western characteristics associated with “political Islam,” a concept that has been reinterpreted for drastically different purposes.
The issue thus becomes not only one of translation in a geopolitical context but also one of translation between isolated instances of universalised capitalist governmentality, like Iran, and the overarching universality of capitalist relations. This particularity seems to have fostered various forms of (anti-)imperialist othering when it comes to viewing struggles in Iran: from the perspective of Western imperialism, these struggles are seen as rooted in an absolutely defined past—erasing the lineage of solidarity with Arab, Afghan, and Kurdish revolutionaries—and an assumed future, represented by Western liberal democracy. Meanwhile, Eurocentric and/or Orientalist anti-imperialists dismiss revolutionary subjects in favour of a geopolitical narrative where only great powers are agents of History.
This dialectic of isolation contributed to the rise of campist anti-imperialism regarding Iran and to the imperialist co-optation of Iranian struggles. And between these two forces, the Left seems to have lost its way in translation.
Before the 1979 Revolution, Iranian revolutionaries and their Arab comrades from various countries—particularly united under the banner of the Palestinian cause—maintained organic, organisational connections. Armed militants fought together and received military training in the same camps, most notably in South Lebanon. This period, unmarked by the Islamist/Non-Islamist divide that characterises the present situation, was defined by alliance, cooperation, the coproduction of militant knowledge, and dialogue. However, in the decades following the 1979 Revolution, these connections were largely severed.
The breakdown in communication has manifested in the profound confusion in understanding contemporary Iran, both from within and from without. For decades, theorists from both the left and the right have debated the nature of Iran’s political economy. Some have described it as state capitalism, others as neoliberal capitalism, while some reject the notion that it represents any form of capitalism at all. Among these critics, some characterise Iran’s economy as one of predation, hoarding, or as a confiscatory regime.
A similar ambiguity surrounds the nature of the Iranian state’s governmentality: is it a pre-modern regime? A fundamentalist Islamist one, embodying “political Islam”? Or is it modern—perhaps even exercising a form of neoliberal governmentality?
The debate extends to Iran’s place in global power dynamics. Some argue that it is part of the anti-imperialist camp, resisting the hegemony of the West by forming an “axis of resistance.” Others label it a sub-imperialist state, attempting to dominate the Middle East through its “proxies.” Famously, it has been categorised as part of the “axis of evil,” drawing comparisons to North Korea in its approach to international relations. Another perspective views Iran as being within the orbit of the Russia-China alliance, serving as a tool for these global superpowers.
This special profile on Iran seeks to address these points of contention and to present a clearer image of the country, beginning with a conference featuring eight panels focused on the relationship between Iran and its neighbouring countries in the region. These discussions will take place in dialogue between Iranian scholars, activists, thinkers and their comrades from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, Turkey and Palestine.
This conference will lay the groundwork for an upcoming Weird Economies summer school focused on broader themes related to Iran, including its political economy, geopolitical position, and the history of the left in the country.